

2019 Taiwan-Japan Strategic Dialogue
Interest and Challenges of Taiwan's Participation into FOIP:
Importance of the Taiwan-Japan Strategic Tie

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Abstract: Owing to China's rise and its outwards development in terms of Belt and Road Initiative, has emerged after the Cold War era the greatest strategic and security challenge toward United States of America. Hence, Washington has engaged a multilateral structure of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" instead of previous Obama's "Rebalancing toward Asia", which included military, economic, democratic governance issues and encompassed not only bilateral military alliance with US allied in this region, but also linkages with important country such as Taiwan under "Asia Reassurance Initiative Act."

In fact, important key of China's accomplishment of Belt and Road Initiative based on its construction of "Blue Navy Water" in order to reach two goals: strategic ideas of "Regional Sea Control" and "Maritime Patrol ". Originally, in 2012 China proclaimed its 18 Party Congress Report, which China emphasized concept of "Maritime Power "and PLA Navy has implemented three step of "Maritime strategy": First, "内海 / ないかい" inland sea of first Island Chain, second breakthrough of chock point of Island Chain, and Linkage of Two Oceans: Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In the same way, whether US can in advance restraint China's blue water navy from Pacific into Indian Ocean or not is a crucial question since US has already applied "Air Sea Battle operation" into "Joint concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons , JAM-GC" and the key challenge for US is how to safeguard chock point and intermediate area of the First and Second Island Chain. In sum, under US-China strategic competition in Indo-Pacific

Region how to safeguard intermediate area of the First and Second Island Chain is the utmost importance task and also revealed the significance of Taiwan-Japan security and strategic relationships. Therefore, how to control transformation between Interior and exterior line operation in the intermediate area, and how to transform peace time into crisis situation and to arrange and prepare every kind of scenarios and War game regarding future change of Indo-Pacific strategic constellation.

First, the author describes origins and concepts of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Second, explain factors impact Indo-Pacific security environment. Third, clarify Taiwan's interest and challenge of the participation into Indo-Pacific strategy and importance of Taiwan-Japan strategic connection related to defend Island Chain security. Finally, the author proposes some future development of Indo-Pacific strategy and policy suggestions toward Taiwan-Japan strategic dialogue.

Keywords: Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Belt and Road Initiative, Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, Blue Water Navy, First Island Chain, Interior and exterior line operation, Taiwan-Japan strategic relations, War Gaming

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I. Preface

On March 2, 2019, President Tsai In-wen were interview by the Japan's Sankei Shimbun which she mentioned that she would "respect Japan's opinion" regarding how such dialogue should be held. ¹Because of Taiwan's geo-strategically location in East Asia and as part of the first island chain, President Tsai emphasized that the importance of Taiwan-Japan strategic relations. In this respect, President Tsai has for the first time conveyed committed to conduct direct dialogue with the Japanese government on cyber-security and regional security issues.

Actually, on June 28, 2018, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) has called for Japan to engage in a security dialogue with Taiwan, as both nations have come under military pressure and threats from China. In an interview with the Sankei Shimbun , Wu called for Taiwan and Japan to initiate a security dialogue, saying that ensuring security is a shared responsibility of the two nations.²

In fact, on Aug. 28, 2018 President Tsai In-wen said that Taiwan and Japan should expand cooperation and exchanges in an effort to more effectively manage challenges stemming from extreme weather.³ President Tsai has also stressed friendly interactions between Taipei and Tokyo and upholding freedom, democracy, human rights, peace and prosperity. But President Tsai underlined the recent actions of China to subdue Taiwan's international space are threatening the cross-strait status quo and impacting security and stability in East Asia.

¹ "President Tsai eyes security dialogue with Japan", Taipei Times, accessed at: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/03/03/2003710741>(2019/05/10)

² "Joseph Wu urges Japan to set up security dialogue", Taipei Times, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/06/28/2003695679>(2019/05/10)

³ According to President Tsai, "Taiwan and Japan enjoy robust relations and frequent people-to-people exchanges. This healthy state of affairs is further illustrated by the high number of reciprocal visits made by local government officials, as well as the more than 100 sister pacts signed to date by the two sides" please see "Tsai calls for Taiwan-Japan cooperation on combating extreme weather", Taiwan Today, accessed at: <https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=140578> (2019/05/10)

Since in year of 2018 Japan has backed Taiwan to access into the World Health Assembly as an observer and a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Importance is, when Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force encircle Taiwan and breakthrough Ryukyu Islands into Second Island Chain, Taipei and Tokyo should exchange information owing to safeguard East Asia security.⁴ The problem is that Japan must concern the perspective from Beijing counterpart because the emerging conflict relationships with China after China has released so called "East China Sea Air Identification Zone" in 2014.

First, the author describes origins and concepts of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Especially from US, Japan and India different point of this emerging concept of Indo-Pacific Region. Second, the author explains elements affect Indo-Pacific security background and especially US-China power rival in this area. Third, refine Taiwan's interest and challenge of the participation into Indo-Pacific strategy and significance of Taiwan-Japan strategic connection related to defend First and Second Island Chain security. Finally, the author offers some future development of Indo-Pacific strategy and policy recommendations toward Taiwan-Japan strategic dialogue.

II. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region: Origin, Concept and Development

End of Obama administration US announced so called "Rebalancing toward Asia" in order to withdrawal its military forces from Central Asia and Europe to Asia. But after Trump took power and under slogan of "America first " he initiatives a "Free and Open Indio-Pacific " Region to coordinate US allied around Pacific and Indian Ocean. Originally, this concept of "Indo-Pacific" region was backed from Japan and India. It means before 2016 Japan and India have already initiative this kind of arrangement in order to counter a rising China.

⁴ "Japan backed Taiwan's international participation", Taipei Times, accessed at: [http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/03/03/2003710741\(2019/05/05\)](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/03/03/2003710741(2019/05/05))

At the same time, during Obama Administration from 2008-2016, especially after 2011 he announced his national security thinking “Rebalancing toward Asia” which included three pillars: 1.Economically, he initiative Trans Pacific Partnership, to reorganize collective economic integration in this area; 2.Militarily, The US enhanced its military deployment in Asia-Pacific to engage China’s military strategy which called Anti-Access and Area-Denial, A2AD; 3.Politically, Washington widen democracy and freedom of speech in this area and also engaged with strategic allied with China, such Burma, Thailand and Vietnam. In this period, US believed via economic and cultural means to impact these countries around Pacific and Indian Ocean.

In 2016 when Donald Trump took power as US President he changed all national strategy thinking from former President Obama. According to his first National Security Strategy Report there are four pillars of US National security strategy and under pillar IV: Advance American Influence, The Strategy in a Regional Context, under Indo-Pacific Trump highlights the emergence of this region and also identifies this range of Indo-Pacific is from “the west coast of India to the western shore of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world.”⁵

At the same time, Japan and India also initiative the same strategic framework in Asia-Pacific region, which they can counter influence from China’s rise. From Japan side, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had endorsed the notion since his first term in 2007, and later created the term in 2016. According to chapter 1 International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016 of Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 ”,⁶that is, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy a key for stability and prosperity of the international community is dynamism that is created by two continents and two oceans.

⁵ See The White House, “US 2017 National Security Strategy”, Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017.

⁶ Please see “Chapter 1 International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016”, Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, accessed at: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html>.(2019/05/10)

From India perspective, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has broadened the term, stating at an IISS (The International Institute for Strategic Studies) Asia Security Summit that the Indo-Pacific should comprise all geographical nations and the other nations that have risks in the region. India's situation of effect in the Indian Ocean is the key issue of India's maritime policy but the aggregate communication of the IOR with its eastern neighbor and the South China Sea stresses related concerns for the same.⁷ From India perspective, all Indian Ocean belongs to New Delhi core interest and India can also control important sea-lane of communication from Middle East , Indian Ocean to Pacific Ocean.

Since the second half of 2017, US President Donald Trump and other senior officials have regularly stated the "Indo-Pacific" concept, but not as a strategy. International speculation has eddied over whether this is a geopolitical strategy or a geo-economic one. In June 2018 US former Defense Secretary James Mattis used "Indo-Pacific strategy" in his remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue. It outlets at US plans to shape more of a geopolitical military alliance than an economic one in the Indo-Pacific region. But some observer believed that this Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region is a counter to China's BRI, which heavily involves Japan, India and Australia. Because it is perceived as a connection of democracies, guaranteeing the economic and trade links between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. ⁸

Since United States wants a "free and open Indo-Pacific," as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has advised and U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe considered at their meeting in Tokyo in 2017, no two powers will be as important as India and Japan. Because the use of the term was a difference from language employed by Obama administrations,

⁷ Japish S. Gill & Ryan Mitra,, "India's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Understanding India's Spheres of Influence",July 5, 2018, [http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2018/7/5/indias-indo-pacific-strategy-understanding-indias-spheres-of-influence.\(2019/05/10\)](http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2018/7/5/indias-indo-pacific-strategy-understanding-indias-spheres-of-influence.(2019/05/10)

⁸ "Mounting tension in Asia", Geopolitical intelligence service, accessed at: [https://www.gisreportsonline.com/mounting-tension-in-asia,2730,c.html\(2019/05/10\)](https://www.gisreportsonline.com/mounting-tension-in-asia,2730,c.html(2019/05/10)

and has led to assumption that it could have to do with Washington reducing the ground for a renewal of the so-called Quadrilateral strategic alliance consisting of the US, Japan, Australia and India to counter China's rise.⁹

Based on the US 2017 National Security Strategy Report stated the idea of US "vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation and from "ECONOMIC: The United States will encourage regional cooperation to maintain free and open seaways, transparent infrastructure financing practices, unimpeded commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes" and from "MILITARY AND SECURITY: We will maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary. We will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners."¹⁰

On June 2, 2018 the US former secretary of defense Mattis has made a very clear speech during the Shangri-la security dialogue which stated Both Indo-Pacific strategies affirm the Indo Pacific as critical for America's continued stability, security, and prosperity and via this Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy US is deepening alliances and partnerships as a priority, ASEAN's centrality remains vital, and cooperation with China is welcome wherever possible. Also while US discover new chances for meaningful multilateral cooperation and deepen US engagement with existing regional mechanisms at the same time.

2018 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech - America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision - at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum on July 30, 2018 demonstrating that the US' Indo-Pacific strategy has not only geopolitical aims, but also geoeconomic cooperation plans. In the speech, Pompeo clarified the geographical range of the Indo-Pacific strategy and

⁹ "WHY IS THE US CALLING ASIA-PACIFIC THE INDO-PACIFIC? DONALD TRUMP TO 'CLARIFY'", South China Morning Post , accessed at: <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2118806/why-us-calling-asia-pacific-indo-pacific-trump-clarify> (2019/05/01)

¹⁰ Please see The White House, "US 2017 National Security Strategy", Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017.

underscored India's position. He defined the Indo-Pacific for the first time in over a year as stretching "from the United States west coast to the west coast of India," basically the previous Asia-Pacific plus India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. A "free and open" Indo-Pacific, as the US refers to, shares similarity with an open, inclusive and transparent BRI of China. Pompeo defined that a "free and open" Indo-Pacific means the US wants all nations "to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries" and "to enjoy open access to seas and airways."¹¹

Also as part of US commitment to improving regional security in the Indo-Pacific, Washington is agitated to proclaim nearly \$300 million in new funding to emphasize security cooperation throughout this Indo-Pacific region. According to this new security assistance will progress US shared priorities, especially to strengthen maritime security, develop humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping capabilities, and enhance programs that counter transnational threats. ¹²Until nowadays US has only announced its 2017 National Security Strategy and ARIA, but go further invest material and budgets into this Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region.

III. Factors impact Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region: International and Regional Dimensions

There are many factors impact the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region or Strategy. Especially, when China after its 18 Party Congress in 2012 and began new era of China's development. That is, after Xi Jin-ping has token power in 2012 as General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party, CCP, Xi released "Chinese Dream" and "Recovery of Chinese Nations" and in 2013 raised a "One Belt. One Road initiative", created "Silk road foundation" and "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB", in order to fulfill China's power

¹¹"Indo-Pacific strategy is more like a geopolitical military alliance", The information corridor, [https://theinfocorridor.com/2018/09/07/indo-pacific-strategy-is-more-like-a-geopolitical-military-alliance/\(2019/05/10\)](https://theinfocorridor.com/2018/09/07/indo-pacific-strategy-is-more-like-a-geopolitical-military-alliance/(2019/05/10))

¹² Please State of Department , accessed at: [https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/284924.htm\(2019/05/05\)](https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/284924.htm(2019/05/05))

influence upon Asia-Pacific area. China has eager to create the “Beijing Consensus” instead of “Washington Consensus” which leads to a power competition between the US and China in Asia-Pacific Region. Under these strategic thinking Beijing must preserve its maritime development from West Pacific Ocean to Indian Ocean.

China’s leader also advocated “Common human destiny community” to fulfill his ideas of “Chinese Dream.” At 19 party congress in 2017 Xi has arranged the future China’s nation-building plan from 2021 to 2049, it means, from 2021-2035 China has plan of “Socialist modernization” and fulfillment of world power in 2049.

From international dimension perspective first important issue is the China’s blue navy water strategy and divided into three phases: 1.First, to “inland sea of first Island Chain; 2. Secondly, to breakthrough of chock point of Island Chain; 3.Thirdly, China try to make a Linkage of Two Oceans: Pacific and Indian Oceans. Just like Wieck’s research revealed that China is trying to establish a sphere of maritime influence in three stages, as follow:

“The first stage involves controlling the first island chain that links Okinawa Prefecture Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The second stage, to be completed by 2050, involves controlling the second island chain that links Ogasawara island chain, Guam, and Indonesia. The final stage involves ending U.S. military dominance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”¹³

Some research also indicated that China’s maritime strategy focus on the first and foremost on the first island chain that runs from the Kurils through Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines to Borneo, however the second island chain from Japan south to the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, Micronesia, Palau and Papua New Guinea will be critical in the long term. ¹⁴ However,

¹³ Brian D. Wieck, “Information Operations Countermeasures to Anti-Access/Area Denial”, Indian Strategic studies, <http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2017/05/information-operations-countermeasures.html> (2019/05/10)

¹⁴ “China Sets a Course for the U.S.’s Pacific Domain”, Stratfor, [https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain.\(2019/05/10\)](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain.(2019/05/10))

Taiwan has six diplomatic allies in this area and Beijing has also taken strong offensive action in order to change the diplomatic landscape in this region.

And China's PLA force position is still fixated on the country's maritime and territorial peripheries and Beijing is gradually building a more global military footprint. The PLA has carried out counter-piracy missions, crisis evacuations and naval exercises thousands of miles from China's coast. They have ventured into the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea and other faraway waterways. Nowadays the PLA Navy is increasing capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, destroyers and escort combat ships that may finally deliver some form of global power-projection capability.¹⁵

Another reason for China's PLA to enter the Second Island Chain is to exert effective control toward the South China Sea. Because the South China Sea is a source of both natural resources, such as fish harvest, oil and gas reserves and the location of critical sea lines of communication. After 2013 not only the East China Sea dispute with Japan, Beijing and Manila has also regarding the Spratly Islands began a territorial waters dispute. China began to build up seven artificial islands surrounding the Spratly Islands. The US former President Obama has already accused China's build up those artificial islands and made these islands for the military purpose. Since then the US Navy began its Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea and across Taiwan Straits.

Because of China's Belt and Road Initiative is not just a traditional thinking of geo-dimension from Euro-Asia toward Europe and Africa, but also reached out to Central and South America and the South Pacific Ocean. And most of

¹⁵ Hal Brands, "China's Master Plan: A Global Military Threat From the East China Sea to Africa, Beijing is flexing its muscles", 2018年6月10日, Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-10/china-s-master-plan-a-global-military-threat> (2019/05/10)

Taiwan's diplomatic allies located in these regions and the US administration nowadays enhance regional connections with these countries in order to counter strategic influence by China's world arrangement. Since the reduction in U.S. interest in Pacific islands like the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau will increase Chinese influence in the area and when US-China's competition is accumulating. And Australia, Japan and South Korea will all be critical in serving US to offset growing Chinese influence in South Pacific Region.¹⁶

Because the whole islands own a total 19.9 million square kilometers (7.7 million square miles) in collective exclusive economic zones (EEZs) just like twice the size of all U.S. land territory. Kiribati might have a population only just topping 110,000, but its EEZ is the 12th largest in the world. Its neighboring country like the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Marshall Islands also have the 14th, 16th, and 19th largest EEZs, individually.¹⁷ It means in the long run future the South Pacific region will be the power competition point between US and China.

IV. Taiwan's Participation in Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region: Niches and Constraints

Since China has intended to control from the First and Second Island Chain into the South China Sea and also implemented so called A2/AD. According to the "2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)", and the "2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)" has define "anti-access" (A2) as action intended to slow deployment of approachable forces into a theater or cause forces to operate from distances from the location of conflict than they would otherwise prefer and Area denial (AD) is defined as "action intended to impede friendly operations within areas where an adversary cannot or will not prevent access." A2 affects program to a playhouse while AD imitates

¹⁶ "China Sets a Course for the U.S.'s Pacific Domain", Stratfor, [\(https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain\)](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain).(2019/05/10)

¹⁷ "China Sets a Course for the U.S.'s Pacific Domain", Stratfor, [\(https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain\)](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-sets-course-uss-pacific-domain).(2019/05/10)

maneuver within a theater.¹⁸

From US side has initiated the concept of the Air-Sea Battle (ASB). It defines the use of integrated aerial, land-based, naval, space, and cyberspace operations to break through A2/AD and safeguard the actual projection of military forces and also comprises strengths aimed at protecting US rearguard units and bases. ¹⁹In other words, A2/AD, which stands for “anti-access/area denial” military operations, is a strategy for preventing US troops from accessing sites like Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in China, Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan) under an emergency scenario (anti-access) and preventing effective mobile operations by US forces (area denial). ²⁰

US Pentagon officials emphasized that Air-Sea Battle is not only focused on China, which they describe as the “pacing” threat. The following approaches are the basis for the concept.²¹ With this broad guidance the U.S. military will be required by the national command authority to achieve two interrelated missions:

“1) assured access: the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace, achieved by projecting all the elements of national power, and

2) operational access: the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.

Applied to China the strategic goal supported by these missions is restoring assured access by degrading and defeating “counter intervention”

¹⁸ Paul Nantulya ,“On Chinese Strategy: “Counter intervention” in substance but not in name is still “Counter intervention” , Aug 21 , strategic depth, <https://strategicdepth.org/tag/air-sea-battle/> (2019/05/10)

¹⁹ accessed at: <http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2018/02/see-westpac-from-chinese-shore.html>(2019/05/05)

²⁰ “China intensifying its opposition to deployment of THAAD in S. Korea”, Hankyoreh , http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/683224.html(2019/05/10)

²¹ “What is Air-Sea Battle?”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/what-is-air-sea-battle/2012/08/01/gJQAlGr7PX_graphic.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f2ca6eeea2c9 .(2019/05/10)

capabilities.”²²

As part of the strategy, China has reportedly developed and deployed the Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21) ballistic missile, new anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and nuclear-power submarines and arranged situations for counteracting US naval and air powers from reaching a second island chain (maritime defense line) and first island chain.²³

The other import goal for US defense force in Nord-East Asia is to engage North Korea nuclear and missile development. After 2011 North Korea began new stage of missile development and nuclear test rising tensions between US and North Korea. The U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted that American forces are "locked and loaded" to respond to an attack by North Korea. At the same time the U.S. military presence in South Korea is well engaged protectively, it means any offensive strike against the North would need the implementation of a enormous number of military resources, and the US Department of Defense has established that no such implementation has already prepared.²⁴

Nowadays around 23,500 U.S. troops are placed in South Korea and nearly 40,000 more are positioned in Japan. The key U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan would demonstrate essential in any conflict with North Korea. Important mechanisms include Osan and Kunsan Air Bases in South Korea, where American Jet Fighter A-10 and F-16 aircraft are lastingly based. And Yokosuka in Japan is home to the only permanently forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan. The US carrier strike group and its escorting destroyer group are some of the most forceful U.S. military

²² Paul Nantulya, "On Chinese Strategy: "Counter intervention" in substance but not in name is still "Counter intervention", Aug 21, strategic depth, <https://strategicdepth.org/tag/air-sea-battle/> (2019/05/10)

²³ "China intensifying its opposition to deployment of THAAD in S. Korea", Hankyoreh, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/683224.html(2019/05/10)

²⁴ "Major U.S. Military Bases Near North Korea", statista, <https://www.statista.com/chart/10691/major-us-military-bases-near-north-korea/>(2019/05/10)

assets in the East-Asia region.²⁵

According to US military base located in East Asia revealed that US administration believes in the long run future would happen any kind of military crisis in term of North Korea's intention of nuclear development. From this point of view it shows that the importance of Taiwan's strategic location in this region. Therefore, how to combine US leads alliance security and its connection with Taiwan security is the utmost important issue which challenging future of stability and security of the First Island Chain.

So all together on December 31, the last date of 2018 the US President Trump totally has signed 13 acts and one of the most significant Acts by number S.2736 is the "Asia Reassurance Initiative Act", hence ARIA, which is the first official document to stress the US obligation to diktat a free and open Indo-Pacific region 's affairs. So it means, for such determination US will not only defenses a multilateral policy framework and rules-based international order, but also indicated the end of the rebalancing toward Asia policy by former Obama Administration and began an new era of US-China power competition and struggle within Indo-Pacific region.

V. Taiwan-Japan Strategic Tie within Free and Open Indo-Pacific Framework: Importance and Practices

Under this Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region Taiwan and Japan have facing common security threats and shared common interests. Firstly, US and Japan has signed security alliance since 1960 until nowadays because Japan in searching of normalization its nation status in term of the constitutional reform. Japan Primer minister Abe released important law regarding Japan Self-defense Force under US-Japan security alliance. Hence, JSDF can not only joint UN leads "Peace Keeping Operation, PKO", and also under certain

²⁵ "Major U.S. Military Bases Near North Korea", statista ,
[https://www.statista.com/chart/10691/major-us-military-bases-near-north-korea/\(2019/05/10\)](https://www.statista.com/chart/10691/major-us-military-bases-near-north-korea/(2019/05/10))

constellation JSDF can active and flexible response related military conflict or crisis situation protecting Japan's national security. The other important operation is to joint UN peace keeping operation in the world development.

The purpose of Japan is to revitalizing its far offshore island chain in the East China Sea under a developing strategy that goal to try the benches on China's navy and keep it from ever controlling the Western Pacific Ocean. ²⁶The United States and Japan must help exclude growing Chinese military power and both parties has pushed Japan to change its home island defense in favor of employing its military power in Asia. In this respect Tokyo is in charge of lacing a line of anti-ship, anti-aircraft missile batteries along 200 islands in the East China Sea stretching 1,400km from the country's mainland towards Taiwan.²⁷

Japanese Professor Toshi Yoshihara who teaches at the US Naval War College believed that Tokyo could play an important role in limiting China's space for maneuvers through the East China Sea to the Western Pacific, boosting US freedom of movement and buying time for the alliance to respond in the episode of war with China.²⁸Because from US perspective, how to engage the emerging PLA force deployment from West Pacific toward Indian Ocean and to prevent Beijing controlling the sea-lane of communication in order to safeguard US allied security and economic interests.

From 2013 China's activities in the waters off Diaoyutai Islet (Japanese version : the Senkaku Islands) and the growing instances of the PLA air force and navy vessels progressing into the western Pacific through the Ryūkyū

²⁶"Japan fortifies remote island chain to keep China at bay", The Straits Times, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-fortifies-remote-island-chain-to-keep-china-at-bay>.(2019/05/10)

²⁷"Japan fortifies remote island chain to keep China at bay", The Straits Times, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-fortifies-remote-island-chain-to-keep-china-at-bay>.(2019/05/10)

²⁸ "Japan fortifies remote island chain to keep China at bay", The Straits Times, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-fortifies-remote-island-chain-to-keep-china-at-bay>.(2019/05/10)

(Nansei) Islands have become critical issues for Japan’s regional security. During crisis situation, a simple misunderstanding and calculation could possibly lead to a disagreement between Chinese and Japanese navy vessels and both side Maritime Self-Defense Force.²⁹From non-traditional point of view, China applies not only traditional means to deter foreign military forces to safeguard its territorial interests, but also employs non-military means in term of rescue operation, anti-piracy operation, or disaster prevention. Therefore, China can through militant force engage multilateral crisis situation. Owing to Chinese militants called military fishing boats US has began to send the Coast Guard escort by Destroyers to patrol from the South China Sea into the First Island Chain.

Original main countries of Indo-Pacific: US, Japan, Australian and India have set up since 2013 a think tanks from the Heritage Foundation (USA), Vivekananda International Foundation (India), the Tokyo Foundation (through 2017), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (since 2018) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and they have held a series of roundtable conferences named the “Quad-Plus Dialogue”. The purpose of this “Quad-Plus Dialogue” was to organize expert discussions around common strategic concerns among the four democracies - and a circling fifth or “plus” country. The purpose of this “Quad plus 1” was to stimulate the governments to formally re-assemble the official Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which happened in 2017, and to inform discussions among them.³⁰After 2013 until 2019 this Quad, the partner think tanks have taken a rotating approach to hosting the conference as follows:³¹

2013 - Canberra, Australia (hosted by ASPI)

2015 - Jakarta, Indonesia (hosted by The Habibie Center)

2016 - Jaipur, India (hosted by VIF)

2017 - Washington, D.C. (hosted by The Heritage Foundation)

²⁹ Kōda Yōji , “Maritime Concerns and the Future of Sino-Japanese Relations Politics”, Jun 10, 2014, nippon.com, <https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a03102/maritime-concerns-and-the-future-of-sino-japanese-relations.html>(2019/05/10)

³⁰ Accessed at: <https://www.heritage.org/the-quad-plus>(2019/05/05)

³¹ Accessed at: <https://www.heritage.org/the-quad-plus>(2019/05/05)

2018 - Tokyo, Japan (hosted by JIAA)

2019 - Sydney, Australia (hosted by ASPI)

Actually in year 2018 Taiwan has been invited to joint this “Quad+1” strategic dialogue in Japan. The author believed why Taiwan can joint this strategic dialogue although it belongs to track 2 because of US commitment to Taiwan’s security. In 1979 US and China has established formal diplomatic relationship, but at the same year on April 1979, US Congress has approved “Taiwan Relations Act, TRA” to conduct US-Taiwan relations, for some certain degree enhance and stabile situation across the Taiwan Strait. Based on this TRA, US government revealed its goals to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and security and providing Taiwan sufficient defense capabilities in term of selling Taiwan defensive weaponry and logistic equipment.

But in 1982 US and China also signed “1982 Arms sale Communiqué” which understood that US should not sale Taiwan weaponry until in zero number. From political dimension, US government followed its “One China Policy” which recognized Taiwan as a political entity and future of Taiwan’s sovereignty has not been solved and it must through both side people via peaceful means to negotiate. Therefore, we must identify that China always emphasized so called “One China principle,” the US government poses “One China Policy,” but from Taipei point of view, there exist only “One China issues”, and Taiwan already accept there are two different political entities among Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan nowadays the opposition party KMT (the nationalist party) agreed with Chinese Communist Party so called “92 consensus,” which means both sides agree there is only one China, the KMT believes this China is “Republic of China,”i. e., “One China, with different interpretation.”

After 39 years on March 16, 2018 US President Donald Trump endorsed “Taiwan Travel Act, TTA”, exposed US intentions regarding the rise of China to arrange new security organization for the Asia-Pacific region and henceforth Washington initiative so called “Indo-Pacific region” strategy

which included India, Australia, Japan to formulate QUAD alliance in order to strategically contain China from the Indian to Pacific Ocean and under such context Taiwan become a chess player not a pawn in the Asia-Pacific Game. It means that Taiwan must take more constructive approach toward this important international institution development.

From this statement revealed that the importance of Taiwan's contribution to this emerging Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region because of Taiwan's democratization. According to US idea of this Free and Open Indo-Pacific also includes freedom on religion and democracy. In 2018 US organized an international conference regarding these issues and in 2019 this conference was held first time in Taipei. Also Taipei and Washington has engaged in so called "democratic governance mechanism under Indo-Pacific Region" and in the future combine with the other members of Indo-Pacific Region in order to enhance non-traditional strength against China.

The other important mechanism between Japan and Taiwan is the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee. Taiwan and Japan began their first fishery talks in 1996 and, over the past 17 years, have held 16 formal meetings and also numerous preliminary conferences and discussions. From Japanese side always very cautious related to make official agreement with Taiwan owing to Tokyo and Beijing strategic relationship.

From this kind of conciliation is to set aside disputes and approving to share fishery resources in this latest round of talks and Taiwan and Japan were able to make suitable preparations and succeed real results regarding fishery issues starting from the interrelating of their separate "exclusive economic zones "(EEZ). The other reason why Japan want to handle this issue with Taiwan because Tokyo has facing China's handling concerning East China Sea disputes with Japan.

During the talks, from Taiwan side restated that the Diaoyutai Islands are an inborn part of the territory of the Republic of China on Taiwan and an island

group belonging to Taiwan. The waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands have long been traditional fishing grounds of Taiwanese fishermen, whose fishing rights should be accorded full protection under the law.

On August 5, 2012, in order to increase the friendly relations between Taiwan and Japan and to better safeguard regional peace, stability, and maintainable development, the former President Ma Ying-jeou, suggested the “East China Sea Peace Initiative” in prospects that through determined strengths the parties concerned could convert the East China Sea into a “sea of peace and cooperation.” Some observers believed that since Taiwan signed Fishery agreement with Japan, that means Japan can solve territorial conflicts alone with China. Therefore, Taiwan got the right to fishery rights in the East China Sea near Diaoyutai Islands, but regarding territorial dispute will be the issues of Japan and China.

On April 11, 2019 Taiwan and Japan have ultimately stretched agreement to continue to follow existing fishery rules in overlapping waters in the East China Sea in the latest round of talks held in Tokyo. Since 2014 Taiwan and Japan has reached a committee to resolve the fishery conflict in the East China sea and around Diaoyutai Islet. And after two previous failures to reach a agreement over the issue, the Taiwanese delegation and its Japanese counterpart came to terms in their third round of talks, as part of the eighth round of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Commission meeting. Since in the previous rounds of talks, the Japan and Taiwan had already established on whether to inaugurate automatic identification systems on fishing vessels and on issues concerning vessel owners' protection and indemnity insurance, and preserving the current maritime zone decided upon in a 2013 fisheries pact.

VI. Conclusion

Taiwan nowadays facing a strategic problem between US leads Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s “One Belt, one Road” Initiative. Because Taiwan can’t

choose both sides owing Beijing's position toward Taipei. Under this context Taiwan must understand how to handle with US Indo-Pacific strategy and prevent the risk of cross-strait relations development.

Taiwan must take multilateral approaches to this new US-China regional strategic and power competition. Taipei should link with US Indo-Pacific framework and to regulate its role under this process. On the other hand, Taiwan shall also apply its new southbound policy to employ with ASEAN nations in order to widen its international space. That is, how to connect Taiwan's new southbound policy and Indo-Pacific Region from non-traditional aspects.

Taiwan must deeply study the substances of ARIA and to comprehend how to improve US-Taiwan relations through diplomatic, defense and economic cooperation. Because ARIA is an important act regarding Indo-Pacific strategy and it revealed US administrations will to booster development of Indo-Pacific strategy. Particularly, the ARIA declared, "support for regular arms sale" and enhance "diplomatic and defense contacts" between Washington and Taipei.

After ARIA US Senator Cory Gardner is engaging a new initiative called "Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, TAIPEI ACT". Via this US unilateral Act designed a legal approach to set up US-Taiwan relations including prior Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances, and Taiwan Travel Act. If US president Trump signs this Act it means Taiwan can apply this Act to contact with US from multilateral dimension.

But from Beijing side, China will haste its peaceful reunification agenda with Taiwan. Not only Beijing applies economic and social exchange with Taiwan society, but also enhance its military operation against Taiwan. Therefore, Taipei should cautious how to engage with US and China regarding cross-strait situations. From previous government there is only one choice: pro US policy. But during 2000-2008 former President Chen shui-bian's period

applied so called dual balance of power against. President Chen pursuit “de jure” Taiwan independence and by use of international propaganda against China. But in President Ma Yin-jeou period he took pro-China policy, but also more friendly policy to the US side. After 2016 when President Tsai took the power she made pro-American policy, but at the same time China opposed President Tsai’s policy. In order to contain Taiwan’s international participation and development, Beijing has via multilateral approaches to pressure Taiwan to go back to “One China Principle.”

1. Future Development of FOIP and Asia Security

Nowadays when people talking about Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region or strategy just like we mentioned “One Belt, One Road” Initiative or strategy present multilateral discourse concerning different meaning and different intention from key player, such as US, Japan and India in Indo-Pacific Area.

From US perspective how to strategically engage a emerging China and counter balance China’s economically influence around Indo-Pacific region Washington planed not only unilateral via trade negotiation, but also through way of Freedom on Navigation across the South China Seas onward into West Pacific Ocean. After US-China trade incremental come to a final solution the US administration will initiative a new way of containment toward China because of Beijing has already set up her future national goal regarding blueprint of socialism modernization in 2035 and in 2049 the world great power in term of fulfillment of these two “One Hundert year goals.”

Since China success her 50 years goal but maintains her un democratic social system and lack of respect on human right, freedom of religion and speech ultimately will be the common security challenges toward freedom of world community. So US has released a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy or Region nowadays absence of a clear-cut picture to accomplish following not only policy and also practically management in term of this Indo-Pacific security and development.

In the near future, US leads Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region facing also several obstacles, such as, what is attitude of India toward this concept, because India has already emphasized that this Free and Open Indo-Pacific Framework can't exclusive any related Nation-State around this region. And Indian primer minister is nowadays searching normalization with China and plays neutral position regarding US-China power struggle. Secondly, Nations of South-east Asian Association still perceived security issues relied on US, but from economic affairs depend on China. Thirdly, US President Trump in this moment not only deal with Iran nuclear issues, but also facing internal domestic problems regarding Trump's personal financial records. Therefore, the future development of Free and Open Indo-Pacific region into strategy depends on the will of Trump and wither he can obtain the party presidential candidate or not.

2. Strategic Thinking of Taiwan-Japan Security Structure Building

From geo-political and strategically standpoint Japan is a very important neighboring country toward Taiwan's national security constellation. Since 1895 to 1945 Taiwan was under Japan's colonial governance for 50 years and after 1970s when Taiwan booster its economic development Japan play an important role regarding regional industry production and important receiver of Japanese technical research and development.

Since 2013 because of Japan's nationalization of Diaoyutai Islets in East China Sea and henceforth Beijing proclaimed "Air Defense Identification Zone in East China Sea. The Japan Coast Guard and Self Defense Force Navy together patrol the East China Sea and close area toward the North-east part of Taiwan. Not only China send her PLA air force and navy patrol and encircle whole Taiwan region, but also stationed her military force beyond the First Island Chain into Second Island Chain.

And Beijing recently proclaimed her "one country, two system" formula and its implementation in term of "Two system Taiwan formula" in order to

booster so called reunification with Taiwan. From these point of views Taipei and Tokyo shared mutual security threats from China military expansion and also from non-traditional security threats because of earthquake, extremely weather, climate change etc., both sides must help each other and exchange experiences regarding countermeasures.

From the other perspective, because of China's economic development and military modernization has caused security threats toward Japan. Since 2010 China's GDP has increased and surpasses Japanese economic development and became the world Nr. 2 besides the US GDP. Also the Chinese people's liberation army after 1979 has become also the world Nr.2 after US military capability. Since China has regulated air force and naval patrol through Taiwan Straits and First and Second Island Chain. In this respect, Taiwan and Japan facing same degrees of threats from Beijing's side and must figure out way of management.

3. Policy Suggestions and Research Recommendation

Regarding Taiwan-Japan strategic relationship both side can from strategically and tactically ways enhance bilateral relations:

- a. Taiwan-Japan strategic Dialogue +1 : To booster Taiwan-Japan strategic relations from track 2 to track 1.5 into Track 1. In so fern, both sider must set up a enduring platform from the private sector to initiative aftermath activities.
- b. To enhance Taiwan-Japan strategic relationship not only from geo-strategically perspective but also from Indo-Pacific framework standpoint. It means under US leads Indo-Pacific Region how initiative multilateral approach to linkage each other.
- c. Since US-Japan security alliance has been established after 1960 and has practiced for a certain epochs, how can Taiwan indirect affiliated with this security alliance in order to set up mutual understanding concerning military confidence building measures.
- d. Through different approach to explore important issues regarding Taiwan-Japan strategic relations, such as: a field studies and field trips to

related important places, and establishes a War-gaming: scenario building and table discussion.

- e. In the future Taiwan and Japan should build up a common picture regarding crisis situation among Taiwan Straits and together formulate joint research program and make it in publication.**